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This article deals with the concept of freedom in Bergson and in Plotinus. This concept is a 
central one in Bergson’s work, as he himself remarks many times: it is on this concept that he 
builds his own thought and starting from it he interrogates the thought that precedes his. In 
investigating the presence of this concept in Plotinus, Bergson sees it as linked (and confined 
to) the concept of the individuality of the soul. This article seeks to question Bergson’s 
reading, showing that Plotinus' concept of freedom is much more pervasive and closer to 
that of Bergson than Bergson himself thought. As a result, I suggest that both philosophers 
understand freedom as will. Instead of closing the problem, this conclusion opens up new 
questions both - historical and philosophical: Can the concept of will be seen as a foundational 
one in the history of philosophy starting from its Greek inception? Is the will the more radical 
concept under which to elaborate on freedom?  
***
Bergson’s philosophy has in its center a paradox: reality as such is the 
manifestation of freedom. This peculiar position is made evident already in 
the title of his major work, L’évolution créatrice, where that simple adjective 
attributes to the unfolding of nature the free act of making the unexpected 
emerge. In turn, this implies that the source of this freedom is a consciousness. 
All that lives, then, is the springing up of a free consciousness: the élan vital 
unfolds as an act of freedom, based on no previous plan or on an already 
codified script. One would be tempted to water down this daring statement, 
to eliminate what in it is paradoxical, by changing the word «freedom» with 
the milder word «contingency». Were such an operation possible and legitimate 
within the frame of Bergson’s thought, then the other horn, so to say, of the 
paradox would have been dealt with: we would have been able to eliminate 
altogether the word consciousness from the equation. However, neither of these 
words can be eliminated: the writings of Bergson are filled with them and in fact 
his entire philosophical experience rests on them. The duration (durée) is the 
accumulation of all the acts of freedom, which progressively build up to shape 
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a present, which if it is determined as for its provenance, qua accumulated and 
fixed life, it remains nonetheless open as for its subsequent unfolding. These acts 
of freedom are conscious not in the sense that they are the fruit of a deliberation 
on the part of an intelligence of sorts, but in the sense that they manifest a will 
capable of reacting in unpredictable ways to the surrounding circumstances. 
Consciousness is rather to be understood as intuition, that is the presence of 
all that has been lived, the durée, in one point, through a tension, which in its 
turn unfolds in a distention. Reality is, thus, the interplay of a tension and a 
distension: in the former the will, the élan vital, is gathered as in a point, while 
in the latter in unfolds towards the fixity of determinate forms1. This interplay 
is the space of conscious freedom2.
If freedom is the trait that characterizes all of reality in its unfolding, it 
does not exclude the self. Rather, this latter is in its turn immersed in it like 
anything else. However, the freedom of the self, taken usually as its prerogative 
in the form of free will (liberum voluntatis arbitrium), is looked at in its turn 
in a different light. The freedom of the self cannot be seen only as the ability 
on the part of each individual to choose between different options, thought of 
as possibilities already given; but as the continuous motion of something that 
poses itself as it goes, re-actualizing into new forms what is already there in its 
lived past3. Thus, freedom is the act itself of the durée, which as such creates as 
it goes its own possibilities, and by doing that it creates itself every time anew. 
In this case also, the word consciousness does not refer first and for most to an 
act of deliberation, but to a tension, whereby the self gathers itself in its totality 
through an act of will4, out of which new realities are going to be created. It is 
worth reading a passage from L’évolution créatrice, where this point is exposed:
Cherchons, au plus profond de nous-mêmes, le point où nous nous sentons le 
plus intérieurs à notre propre vie. C’est dans la pure durée que nous nous replongeons 
alors, une durée où le passé, toujours en marche, se grossit sans cesse d’un présent 
absolument nouveau. Mais, en même temps, nous sentons se tendre, jusqu’à sa limite 
extrême, le ressort de notre volonté. Il faut que, par une contraction violente de notre 
personnalité sur elle-même, nous ramassions notre passé qui se dérobe, pour le pousser 
compact et indivisé, dans un présent qu’il créera en s’y introduisant. Bien rares sont les 
moments où nous nous ressaisissons nous-mêmes à ce point: ils ne font qu’un avec nos 
actions vraiment libres5.
1 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, Paris 2013, p. 201.
2 As is well known, this theme is central already in the first major work of Bergson, Matière 
et mémoire.
3 On this particular point cf. the penetrating remarks of R.-M. Mossé-Bastide, Bergson et Plo-
tin, Paris 1959, pp. 308-314.
4 What is at work here has an unmistakable Augustinian mark: the couple tension-distension 
as possibilities of the will is what governs Augustine’s transformation of Plotinus’ cosmological 
psichology into an anthropological one, shaped as it is around the investigation of time in 
Conf. XI.
5 H. Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, cit., p. 201.
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The élan vital is the act of freedom that poses itself in its duration, thus 
making a consciousness rise, which is increasingly aware of itself qua act of will 
posing the totality. The self is, thus, looked at as if from behind its boundaries – 
fixed as they are by the prevailing tradition in the confines of deliberative reason: 
now it is seen again as a manifestation of a much larger reality, i.e. a much larger 
consciousness, to which it is necessarily linked and within which it necessarily 
acts. I say ‘again’, because Bergson is not the first to have done this, as I will show 
in the following pages.  
The paradox is, therefore, unavoidable and with it the challenge that it 
poses. The entire philosophical tradition is called into question, as in it freedom 
was disposed of, in favor of systematizations each time based on an understanding 
of reality as something already pre-determined. This confrontation with the 
rest of the philosophical tradition runs across all the works of Bergson: the last 
chapter of L’évolution créatrice, centered as it is on an examination of the previous 
philosophical systems, clearly shows Bergson’s engagement with the previous 
tradition. This engagement is not simply a survey of the history of philosophy, 
but rather a radically critical perspective on it, which as such allows Bergson to 
mark the distance and the novelty of his own position. In chapter 4 of L’évolution 
créatrice we find a condensed and mature form of this long engagement, of 
which the newly published lectures at the Collège de France allow us now to 
appreciate the development. 
The two volumes, recently published, give us the texts of two courses, one 
on the problem of time, the other on that of freedom6. I will concentrate on 
the latter. 
In the course entitled L’évolution du problème de la liberté Bergson 
examines ancient and modern philosophers, skipping over the Middle-Ages. The 
philosopher, with whom his analysis of antiquity culminates, is Plotinus7. The 
works of the head of the so called Neo-Platonic school represent for Bergson a 
privileged point of observation, as in them the core of the tradition that precedes 
is made clear, together with problems that were not made explicit. Plotinus is 
seen by Bergson as the philosopher who allows us to understand what in Plato 
and Aristotle is only touched upon or implied. This is so, because his thought 
– highly systematic, according to Bergson – fully develops, almost exasperating 
it, what in the thought of Plato and Aristotle – both unsystematic, according to 
Bergson – was only at the level of suggestions. The works of Plotinus represent, 
in other words, a systematized development of the unsystematic positions, each 
time different within an implied general view, of his two great predecessors. 
In this sense, the thought of Plotinus brings to fruition certain latent insights 
6 H. Bergson, Histoire de l’idée de temps. Cours au Collège de France 1902-1903, Paris 2016; Id., 
L’évolution du problème de la liberté. Cours au Collège de France 1904-1905, Paris 2017.
7 This, of course, does not surprise those who are acquainted with Bergson, as Plotinus rep-
resents one of his most important interlocutors, as R.-M. Mossé-Bastide, cit., has showed. 
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already present in Plato and in Aristotle; and because of this Plotinus appears as 
a privileged interlocutor out of the ancient tradition8. 
While the tradition before Plotinus had seen reality as the unfolding out 
of a pre-determined model, compressing freedom – a concept never thematically 
posed as such – into the narrow space of contingency9, Plotinus granted more 
consideration to the possibility of freedom as an ingredient in the fabric of 
reality, Bergson thinks. According to him, Plotinus has explicitly posed three 
fundamental questions regarding the problem of freedom10: 1) Given the 
regularity of nature and the fixity of its laws, can we think that there is anything 
like personal freedom? 2) If this freedom exists, what is then the relation of 
the human being with the rest of reality? 3) Assuming that the human being is 
free and that he can act on his freedom, even surpassing and undoing the fixed 
regularity of the established order of nature, should he do that?
The first question is the result of Plotinus’ dispute with the Stoics, whose 
positions he counters in all his works. The Stoics saw nature as a great organism, 
which works through what they called συμπάθεια, whereby each single part of 
nature is linked to any other part, not mechanically, but organically. Nature 
is understood as a living body, whose parts, although distant from each other, 
nonetheless are linked, thus exercising and suffering reciprocal influence, for 
the very fact that they are integral parts of one organism. Plotinus accepts this 
doctrine, which in fact represents the core of his understanding of nature and its 
working, but he refuses the strict immanentism that informs all of Stoicism, to 
base it instead on the transcendentalism typical of the Platonic tradition. This 
gives him some space to maneuver a defense of free will: on the one hand nature 
is the result of the unfolding of the activity of the Intellect, which in its acting 
is free of any determination, on the other each of us – as individual – is linked 
to nature as for the part of us that is completely implicated in nature, but is free 
as for that part that does not depend on nature, being of the same reality of the 
Intellect. Bergson brings as evidence of this reading of Plotinus Enn. IV 4.3411, 
in which Plotinus states that we are bound to the body of nature only through 
that part of us which belongs solely to it, whereas for the rest we are our own 
masters12. This solution offered by Plotinus appears to Bergson quite weak, as he 
8 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., pp. 177-179.
9 This is the thesis that informs Bergson’s exposition of the thought of the predecessors of 
Plotinus down to the Stoics: cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., the lectures that 
precede those on Plotinus.
10 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., pp. 180-189 and 191.
11 Cf. Ibid., p. 197 and note 309 p. 363. 
12 Cf. Enn. IV 4.34, 1-7: «Ἡμᾶς δὲ διδόντας τὸ μέρος αὑτῶν εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅσον ἦν ἡμέτερον 
ἐκείνου τοῦ σώματος, μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἐκείνου νομίζοντας, μέτρια παρ᾽αὐτοῦ πάσχειν· ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμφρονες 
τῶν θητευόντων τὸ μὲν τι τοῖς δεσπόζουσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες, τὸ δ᾽αὑτῶν ὄντες, μετριωτέρων τῶν παρὰ 
τοῦ δεσπότου ἐπιταγμάτων διὰ τοῦτο τυγχάνοντες, ἅτε μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὄντες μηδὲ τὸ πᾶν ἄλλου». 
(«But we, by yelding that part of ourselves to experience which was our share of the body of 
the All, and not considering the whole of ourselves to belong to it, are subject to experience 
only within reasonable limits: just as sensible srfs with one part of themselves serve their master, 
but with another belong to themselves, and therefore receive more reasonably limited orders 
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does not see how anything like free determination can be asserted, once reality 
is seen as the «projection» of something already given, i.e. the Intellect itself13.
This criticism of Bergson touches indeed on an important point of Plotinus’ 
thought, showing what is perhaps the fundamental point of distinction between 
Plotinus and the previous tradition. A distinction that being unexpressed and 
thus unresolved stands as the problematic core of Plotinus’ thought: namely, the 
fact that Plotinus does indeed base his understanding of the unfolding of things 
on the ultimatly undetermined, but then recurs to the intellectualistic scheme 
typical of Platonism as well as of Aristotelianism, whereby a fixed determination 
works always as the ultimate foundation. But, leaving aside for the moment this 
point, to which we will later come back, we must go to the second question 
Bergson points out and give a closer look at how Bergson describes the inner logic 
of Plotinus’ doctrine regarding the relation of the soul with the body. For, in it 
we will find all the traits that characterize Bergson’s understanding of the entirety 
of ancient philosophy and of Plotinus within it; this understanding is the same 
that appears in the last chapter of L’évolution créatrice. Bergson sees this question 
as the most important one among the three questions posed by Plotinus. In fact, 
he goes as far as saying that Plotinus himself saw it as the most important, to 
then immediately temper this statement saying that this question is «du moins 
celle que Plotin a traité le plus copieusement»14. As we will see, there is an 
interesting parallelism linking the way in which Bergson understands on the one 
hand the general structure on which the entirety of ancient philosophy rests, and 
on the other the relation between the élan vital and the unfolding of individual 
life (founded on the dichotomy ‘tension’ ‘distension’), with the description he 
gives of Plotinus’ doctrine of embodiment. This question is in Bergson’s opinion 
the most important, perhaps because of the fact that the answer provided to it 
in Bergson’s analysis is at the same time the most fruitful for the development 
of his own ongoing reflection. It is starting from this hypothesis that we will be 
able to question Bergson’s reading of Plotinus as well as appreciate the distance 
that Bergson himself sought to mark between his thought and the rest of the 
preceding tradition. By way of anticipation, this distance rests on Bergson’s 
analysis of the concept of nothingness and its refusal and hence rejection.
In the first part of the last chapter of L’évolution créatrice Bergson examines 
the concept of nothingness. The aim of this examination is to show on the 
one hand that this concept is an empty one, a petition of principle, on the 
from their master since they are not slaves and do not totally belong to another», tr. by A. H. 
Armstrong, in Plotinus. Ennead IV, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge MA 1984, henceforth 
all translations of Plotinus will be taken from Armstrong).
13 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., p. 197: «Si tout qui se fait dans la nature, si la 
nature n’est toute entière que la projection, dans l’espace et dans le temps, de l’Intelligence, si 
notre corps et tout ce que fait notre corps par conséquent est la projection, dans l’espace et dans 
le temps, de ce qui est l’Intelligible correspondant à notre âme, alors tout ce qui se fait dans 
l’espace et dans le temps n’est que la projection, par conséquent, de quelque chose de donné, 
de donné tout d’un coup dans l’incorporel et dans l’éternel».
14 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., p. 191. 
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other to bring to light what Bergson takes to be the guiding assumption of 
the entirety of the philosophical tradition in its dealing with reality. As for 
the former point, Bergson shows how the concept of nothingness is an empty 
one, by underlining the fact that this concept cannot be pictured in anyway, 
being thus an abstraction; moreover and more importantly as a concept it rests 
completely on an act of will on the part of the thinker, who however cannot in 
any way abolish himself qua thinking. Thus, the concept of nothingness is not 
only an empty one, but is also a fiction of the mind. This fact – i.e. nothingness 
being a fiction of the mind – allows us to understand the second point Bergson 
underlines about this concept: this fiction is functional to a certain way of 
construing reality and thus of forming a vision of it. For, once the absolutely 
nothing, i.e. the absolutely void of anything, has been posited, e converso and 
from within the very same logic the absolutely full is also posited. The absolutely 
full is nothing else but what philosophers have thought of as being, understood 
as immutable, perfect, thus fully and already determined. Reality, then, is the 
descending gradation from the higher point, the perfection of being which is 
already given at once15, into nothingness, each thing hence being at most the 
defective version of perfection16.
When describing how Plotinus solves the problem of the presence of the 
soul in the body, more specifically of how the soul gets into a body, Bergson 
sees the same scheme at work. The soul, each individual soul, being one of the 
Intelligibles, is also perfect and whole, given ab aeterno in a dimension that 
transcends time: as such, it is an extreme concentration, a concentrated dot of 
light, in a state of extreme and pristine tension. The embodiment (ἐνσωμάτωσις) 
is then the act whereby this extreme tension gets distended, propagating itself 
in a series of rays, in between which there is darkness, i.e. what Plotinus calls 
matter and Bergson takes to be a name for nothingness. It is worth quoting two 
passages in their entirety:
[…] d’après Plotin, si nous voulions comprendre cette opération, il faut que 
nous nous transportions dans l’Intelligible. Le corps nous apparaît comme inclus dans 
une âme, laquelle âme elle-même est comme la distension, la dilatation dans l’espace et 
dans le temps d’une Idée, d’une essence intelligible; c’est ce que Plotin appelle le νοητόν 
(noèton), c’est-à-dire l’Idée platonicienne, mais devenue celle d’un individu, et non plus 
celle d’un genre17. 
and a few lines after: 
[…] cette Intelligence tout en restant où elle est peut descendre par une partie 
d’elle-même, absolument comme d’un point lumineux partent des rayons, sans que pour 
15 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., p. 197: «quelque chose de donné, de donné 
tout d’un coup».
16 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, cit., pp. 323-225, above all: «Cette conception qui 
transparaît de plus en plus sous les raisonnements des philosophes grecs à mesure qu’on va de 
Platon à Plotin, nous la formulerions ainsi: La position d’une réalité implique la position simul-
tanée de tous les degrés de réalité intermédiaires entre elle et le pur néant».
17 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., pp. 191-192.
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cela ce point lumineux soit en aucune façon amoindri. Pour que l’Intelligence procède 
ainsi, devienne âme et par conséquent corps, elle n’a pas besoin de rien s’adjoindre, 
ce n’est pas une addition, c’est au contraire une diminution. De même que pour tirer 
d’un point lumineux des rayons il n’y a rien à y ajouter que de l’espace vide, en quelque 
sorte de l’espace ténébreux tout autour – on y ajoute du rien en quelque sorte pour 
qu’il rayonne – ainsi pour que l’Intelligence devienne âme et par conséquent corps et 
nature, il n’y a rien à y ajouter, au contraire il faut qu’un principe de diminution, un 
principe ténébreux, s’adjoigne. C’est ce que Plotin appelle la «matière», quelque chose 
de purement négatif18. 
What we notice in these two passages is the equation matter = nothingness, 
which as a posited principle stands at the opposite end of a spectrum whose 
positive end is the fullness of the stable reality that are the Intelligibles. Leaving 
aside the legitimate question, to which we will later come back, whether Plotinus’ 
concept of matter can legitimately be equated with that of nothingness, we can 
stress the fact that the relation between these two poles, the Intelligibles and 
matter/nothingness, is marked by a progressive «diminution». The «diminution» 
which Bergson sees at work is, thus, a diminution of perfect actuality into the 
total nothingness, that is into matter. According to this reading the pole out of 
which reality emanates in Plotinus’ thought is the perfect stability of Intelligibles, 
which with an Aristotelian term we can refer to as perfect actuality. We can 
notice, moreover, that the dichotomy ‘tension’-‘distension’ is also already at work 
in Bergson’s analysis, as it will be in the pages of L’évolution créatrice. However, 
here its sense is determined by the reading Bergson gives of Plotinus’ emanating 
principle of reality. For, while in the pages of his major work the positive pole in 
the dichotomy ‘tension’-‘distension’ is not a substantial reality, given as a fixed 
datum from the start, but is rather the un-boundedness of will, in the reading he 
gives of Plotinus’ doctrine of embodiment the positive pole is an actual and thus 
fixed principle, behind which we cannot climb further. 
To use an image built on Bergsonian terms, we could say that in Bergson’s 
view Plotinus – and with him the previous tradition – sees the unfolding of 
reality not as pure movement, but rather as a motion starting from a fixed point, 
what Bergson calls le mobile, proceeding towards a point zero, which although 
conceived as an absolute void, is in fact a point in its turn. In this way the very 
nature of movement is obfuscated: we end up with a motion from A to A1, a 
motion already predetermined as for its direction as well as its unfolding. And 
together with movement what gets lost is any real understanding of potentiality 
(δύναμις). Using a formula we could say that in Bergson’s reading of Plotinus’ 
thought actuality precedes everything else and is the source of everything else. 
The second question that Plotinus addresses is, according to Bergson, answered 
this way: the human being, qua soul dealing with matter, is the manifestation 
of a distension out of a point of perfect and absolute actuality, the concentration 
of tension. 
18 Cf. Ibid., pp. 193-194.
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Once this understanding of Plotinus’ thought regarding the dealing of the 
soul with matter has been established, Bergson can proceed to give an answer to 
the third question Plotinus posed. An answer that is, of course, an interpretation 
of Plotinus, as such already determined by the preceding interpretation regarding 
the entirety of Plotinus’ thought and its ultimate sense. The third question that 
Plotinus addressed is: «que vaut cette liberté, jusqu’à quel point convient-il 
d’en user, n’y aurait-il pas un meilleur usage à en faire?»19. The guiding word 
to understand Plotinus’ answer to this question is θεωρία. In the reading that 
Bergson gives of this word, it ends up meaning the same thing that it means 
starting from Aristotle down to the Stoics: the retreat of man from activity into 
contemplation of the Intelligibles, of which man himself in his essence is a part. 
In other words, θεωρία understood as contemplation is opposed to activity (πρᾶξις/
ποίησις), this latter being the process of the progressive diminution ending up 
with the production of individual material things.
According to Bergson, thus, Plotinus’ answer to that question is this: given 
the fact that reality is perfect in its own way, as the product of the activity of the 
world-soul, which contemplates the perfection of the Intellect, the individual 
should refrain from using his potentially subversive freedom, and should 
instead limit himself to embrace the orderly perfection of the whole through 
contemplation. This coincides with a withdrawal from any activity within the 
world of becoming in order to fix one’s gaze on the perfection of the stability of 
the Intellect. The end point of θεωρία would then be the fixity of the gaze on 
something fixed and in itself closed: here we see the fundamental reduction of 
Plotinus’ thought – which precisely in the concept of θεωρία becomes peculiarly 
daring- to the scheme of Aristotelian thought.       
Briefly put, Bergson sees the concept of freedom in Plotinus represented –
although never explicitly – in what the philosopher says regarding the individual 
soul20. The phenomenal world is the result of the operation of the world-soul, 
which shapes reality in its totality, that is to say in its general lines. The individual 
soul intervenes on a certain segment of the total fabric woven by the world-soul. 
In this space of intervention the freedom of the individual soul can manifest itself: 
19 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., p. 185.
20 Bergson assumes that the concept of soul can be read as synonymous of that of individual, 
or at the very least he sees each soul as marked by individuality as its main trait. In relation to 
Plotinus and to the Platonic tradition in general, this is quite controversial, and because of this 
much could be said about it. Therefore, I won’t enter here into this problem, but I will limit 
myself to refer the reader to P. Kalligas, Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: a Re-Examination, 
«Phronesis», XLII, 1997, 2, pp. 206-227. P. Kalligas suggests that in Plotinus the soul is per se 
something indefinite, which in its being indefinite possesses the formal reasons (λόγοι) of each 
individual, which qua individual is definite. We might notice that here there is a confirmation 
of the general scheme underpinning the entirety of Plotinus’ thought: δύναμις understood as 
indefinite potentiality, is superior to ἐνέργεια. It seems as fi Plotinus tries to think processually, 
but he uses conceptual tols based on the Aristotelian thought that operates through categories, 
for which actuality, as form, precedes potentiality. Individuals are, hence, for Plotinus actua-
tions, limitations, of the infinite potentiality of the soul, of each soul, which in inteself contains 
all formal reasons.    
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what we are dealing with, then, is a freedom with solidly established boundaries. 
For, the fabric of the whole in its totality is already established. Nothing, 
therefore, of the radical outlook that characterizes Bergson’s position, whereby 
freedom in its essence is not the possibility to choose between different options 
already given, but rather the very act of creation of reality. Plotinus remains 
ultimately bound to the idea of a necessitated and pre-determined nature, an 
idea very distant from the radical position of Bergson, who sees in nature itself 
the manifestation and the unfolding of a fundamental act of freedom.  In this 
perspective, the only true possibility to acquire freedom for the individual soul, 
is to detach itself from all links with the already predetermined sympathetic 
organism of nature, and to tend toward the perfection of the form21. Thus, 
although characterized by a deep urgency regarding the problem of freedom, the 
thought of Plotinus remains in its core fundamentally linked to and determined 
by the thought on necessity that characterizes the tradition that precedes him. 
Moreover, Plotinus’ adherence to the fundamental outlook of the tradition 
before him is also witnessed by the general scheme, to which his philosophy 
can be reduced: reality seen as the descending line that starting from the perfect 
actuality of the principle goes down to nothingness.  
However, we can wonder whether the concept of freedom plays a deeper 
role in Plotinus’ philosophical experience; a role that makes it a concept as 
necessary as it is in Bergson’s philosophy.
Plotinus’ thought has in its center a paradox as well: everything that is, 
is because of and in view of θεωρία22. Θεωρία is the activity through which 
everything that is, is. Plotinus himself was very well aware of the paradoxical 
nature of this position, which he introduces almost as a joke: «Παίζοντες δὴ 
τὴν πρώτην πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν σπουδάζειν εἰ λέγοιμεν πάντα θεωρίας ἐφίεσθαι καὶ 
εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέπειν, […] ἆρ᾽ἄν τις ἀνάσχοιτο τὸ παράδοξον τοῦ λόγου;»23. 
The discourse that he wants to propose is paradoxical, where the adjective is 
to be taken in its literal sense: it goes against the common opinion. In this 
case, the opinion is a sedimented and well established idea that starting from at 
least Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics had permeated the core of Greek philosophy. 
According to it, the human being is the only being capable of reaching θεωρία, 
precisely because he is endowed with reason; θεωρία represents, in fact, the 
21 For all this development cf. the lesson of March 10 in, L’évolution du problème, cit., pp. 191-
207.
22 The word θεωρία is usually translated with «contemplation»; this practice is followed also 
by A.H. Armstrong in translating this word in the Enneads. However, I will restrain from 
translating it and will leave it in Greek, for lack of a better option. This choice is dictated 
by the fact that what Plotinus means with the word θεωρία is not covered at all by the word 
«contemplation», since this latter points to the etsablishment and portioning of a fixed space 
on which the gaze fixes itself (v. Lat. contemplor from cum + templum, this latter term indicating 
a portion of the sky cut by the augur in order to observe the presages: cf. A. Ernout and A. 
Meillet, Dictionaire étymologique de la langue latine, Paris 2001, s.v. templum).  
23 Cf. Enn. III 8.1, 1-3; 8 («Suppose we said, playing at first before we set out to be serious, that 
all things aspire to contemlation, and direct their gaze to this end [...] could anyone endure the 
oddity of this line of thought?»). 
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peak of all the abilities that characterize that particular being, which in its turn 
represents the peak of the animal kingdom, i.e. the human being. Moreover, this 
peculiar trait of the human being is opposed to πρᾶξις: for, as an activity it does 
not consist in the production of something, but rather in the contemplation of 
the principles on which reality itself rests24. We find here the roots on which 
the opposition between vita activa and vita contemplative, exemplified e.g. in the 
works of Petrarch, will unfold throughout the history of Western thought.
Plotinus gainsays both these points: he affirms on the one hand that 
everything that exists is the fruit of  θεωρία, to which it tends. This implies robbing 
man of his position of privilege and equating him to all the rest of reality25. On 
the other hand, he eliminates the dichotomy established by Aristotle between 
θεωρία and πρᾶξις, seeing this latter as a species of the former26.
The concept of θεωρία formulated in this unprecedented manner is an 
attempt to address the question regarding the coming into being of things and 
their abidance in being. We can go as far as saying that it represents a radical 
attempt to take up again and re-think that most Greek of all concepts: φύσις. As 
such, θεωρία, as a concept, finds in the concept of matter its necessary correlative 
correspondent: in this connection, it will become clear that not only was not 
matter understood by Plotinus as nothingness (a concept by the way foreign if 
not even scandalous to Greek thought), but that matter itself represents one of 
the two poles, the necessary linking of which allows to envisage the possibility 
and the reality of generation, where this latter term must not be understood to 
be limited to nature, but to embrace also human production: in his producing, 
man keeps along the line followed by φύσις, only his producing is somewhat 
different in its unfolding. In other words, with the word θεωρία Plotinus tries 
to think the root of productivity as such – i.e. declined both as ποίησις and as 
πρᾶξις – and in order to do so he needs to postulate matter as the receptacle of 
the dynamic activity unfolding in and through θεωρία itself. 
As such, this concept is somewhat of an oddity not only in relation with 
the previous tradition, but in a certain way also within the development of 
24 A poignant summary of this particular perspective can be read in a passage of Epictetus’ 
Discourses, I 6, 13, 19-22: «Τὸν δ᾽ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν 
αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. Διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 
ἄρχεσθαι κὰι καταλήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν 
δὲ ἐφ᾽ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφ᾽ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. Κατέληξεν δὲ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ 
σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει. Ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀποθάνητε». («He [the god] 
introduced man as a contemplator of it and of its works, and not only a contemplator, but also 
an interpreter of them. Because of this it is indecent for man to start and end where all other 
animals start and end, but rather man should start there where all other animals start, but end 
there where nature ends in us. It ended up on contemplation and consciousness and an inquiry 
that agrees with nature. Be careful then not to die without having contemplated these things», 
my translation).
25 Cf. Enn. III 8.1, 3-4: «[…] οὐ μόνον ἔλλογα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ τὴν ἐν φυτοῖς φύσιν καὶ 
τὴν ταῦτα γεννῶσαν γῆν κτλ». («not only rational but irrational living things, and the power of 
growth in plants, and the earth which brings them forth»)
26 Cf. Ibid., 1, 15: «καὶ πρᾶξις πᾶσα εἰς θεωρίαν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχειν κτλ.» («and every action is 
a series effort towards contemplation»).
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Plotinus’ thought. While a quick look at the Lexicon Plotinianum27 would show 
us that the word θεωρία appeared already in treatises that precede III 8, in no 
other place of the Enneads does this word play such a systemic central role. The 
very way in which Plotinus introduces it, a daring joke which sounds like a 
provocative paradox, is an indication that the fruitfulness of this concept with 
all its implications must have dawned on him at a certain point of his thought 
experience as something that he had never thought before in terms as clear as 
the ones he uses in III 828. A testament of this is also the perplexity that scholars 
are caught into regarding the possible origin of this concept, that it to say the 
possible influences it might have arose from. Its importance, in any case, is 
undeniable: under the light it sheds, the entirety of Plotinus’ system – to look at 
it the way Bergson himself does – shows its inner necessity and coherence. For, 
through it the relation between the two poles of Plotinus’ thought, the One and 
matter, is brought to a level of cogency that it does not have elsewhere in the 
Enneads.
When Bergson speaks of the ultimate principle in Plotinus, he seems to 
refer to the Intellect, in a certain way assimilating the One into it. In other 
words, It is as if Bergson subsumed the One in the Intellect, which he describes 
as a fixed order29. This characterization is surely true as for the Intellect, however 
we can wonder whether it is also fitting for the reality that Plotinus tries to 
think when he says «One». This question can also be posed in these terms: in 
which way should the word «principle» be understood when used by Plotinus 
in reference to the One? Of course, such a question opens up an enormous field 
for reflection and as such it cannot be fully answered here. I would then keep 
myself to a brief indication. 
By subsuming the One under the Intellect, Bergson gives an implicit 
interpretation  of the way in which Plotinus tries to think the principle. In 
this interpretation the principle of Plotinus comes out as ultimately coincident 
with that of Aristotle, i.e. an unmoved mover, fixed in its perfection which is its 
absolute actuality. However, does Plotinus think in this terms of the principle? 
Is actuality the ultimate word to be said about it? In reality, the difference 
27 Cf. Lexicon Plotinianum, edited by J.H. Sleeman and G. Pollet, Leiden 1980, s.v.
28 Rivers of ink have been shed on the problem regarding the relation of Plotinus with Gnos-
ticism, but – to my knowledge – none of those studies has taken seriously into consideration 
the cocnept of θεωρία, as it appears here. It would be interesting, then,to investigate whether 
with this concept Plotinus was consciously building a perspective that not only gainsaid the 
creationist idea proper to both Christianity and Gnosticism (which for Plotinus and his circle 
were ultimately the same thing), but did so by going beyond any idea of productivity based on 
a fixed relation between a cause and an effect, the former thought of as actuality, the latter as 
mere potentiality. What Plotinus points to is an acting potentiality, or more apropriately put 
in Latin actuosa potentia. 
29 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, cit., pp. 323-325, especially: «Cette conception qui 
transparaît de plus en plus sous les raisonnements des philosophes grecs à mesure qu’on va de 
Platon à Plotin, nous la formulerions ainsi: La position d’une réalité implique la position simul-
tanée de tous les degrés de réalité intermédiaires entre elle et le pur néant»; and what A. François 
says in n. 128 p. 510. 
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between Aristotle and Plotinus regarding the question of the principle is all 
played out on the correlatively dichotomic couple actuality-potentiality. For 
Plotinus the One is absolute potentiality, ἡ τῶν πάντων δύναμις, as such source 
of anything that is qua fixed in a form, but in itself it is before any fixity. The 
One is the totally undetermined coming before any determination and making 
any determination possible. As such, the One can be described as a will that 
is totally unbound, precisely because it stands before any determination. This 
doctrine regarding the principle, radically different from the understanding of it 
that Greek philosophers has elaborated in the course of centuries, is put forth by 
Plotinus in Enn. VI 8. There the discussion centers directly on the problem of 
freedom, which is analyzed according to the concepts of τὸ ἐφ᾽ἡμῖν, «that which 
depends on us», τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, which indicates the «being in command of one’s 
own powers», and finally τὸ ἑκούσιον, which is «what corresponds to our will». 
Plotinus thinks that while the first concept points to the fact that we are limited, 
in that there are things that are outside of our control and even those actions of 
ours, of which we are masters, can in reality be the fruit of ignorance, the second 
concept points to an absolute freedom, not impeded either by external obstacles 
or by our own ignorance. The example he brings to elucidate the first point is 
the case of Oedipus: it was surely in his power to kill the man, but the action is 
not totally his own, because he did not know that that man was his father. As a 
consequence, the real αὐτεξούσιον is there only when there is also the ἑκούσιον, 
in which the will tends by its own inner inclination always to what is known to 
be good and right. In this sense, the absolute power of the One, which to be 
such needs to be an absolute freedom, is de facto already and from the beginning 
bound to something that in a way transcends it, i.e. what is known to be good. 
Bergson acutely notes this point and what it entails: if out of the One 
the Intellect is produced, then this production such as it is appears to be 
necessitated by the Intellect, which had to be that way, since it is the best way30. 
Hence, we have the problematic view, whereby the absolute freedom of an 
originary, unbound will is already bound by an inner necessity manifested in 
the appearance of the Intellect. The fixity of the Intellect casts its shadow on the 
One itself: what by its own nature thrusts us to conceive it as unbounded and 
undetermined potentiality, pure free will, is tied back into the determination of 
an already fixed order, based on knowledge. Here, the most profound trait of 
Platonism resurfaces and determines the course of Plotinus’ thought, namely 
intellectualism, as Bergson duly notes. 
However, we find in Plotinus’ thought a need to think the principle as the 
ultimately potentiality; this very same need animates his thought on matter. For, 
only because of this matter can be the ultimately undetermined, what offers the 
possibility for things to appear as fixed in and by a form31. The world can be 
30 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution du problème, cit., pp. 198-199.
31 Cf. Enn. II 4.15, 16-20: «οὐ τοίνυν συμβεβηκὸς τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἄπειρον· αὐτὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἄπειρον. 
Ἑπεὶ κὰι ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ εἴη ἂν γενηθὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπειρίας ἢ 
δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ ἀεί, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀπειρίας ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος» («so the unlimited is not an 
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what it is, i.e. a κόσμος – either an intelligible or a material one – only because 
there is a reality out of which any form emerges and on which it operates as form. 
If we pause to reflect on the fact that for Plotinus the «out of which» is clearly 
the One, while the «on which» is just as clearly matter, then it would seem that 
the fact that both the One and matter are characterized by being conceived as 
ultimate potentiality points to them being the two extremes of a same line. A 
line which descends from the peak of power of the One itself into the exhaustion 
of that very power, which is matter. In other words, Plotinus seems to think 
reality as a continuous flow of energy, which actualizes itself in different forms, 
resulting into a fixed order (κόσμος), as it goes. It would even seem that the 
difference in liveliness between the noetic world of the Intellect and the one 
down here is a direct result of the difference of power, which decreases in terms 
of generativity as it proceeds from the One: intelligible matter, the one on which 
the intelligible world rests, is more fecund than matter down here, on which our 
world rests32.  
One could raise the objection here that precisely this point goes in the 
direction pointed out by Bergson, namely that qua final end of the linear out-
flowing that starts from the plenitude of the One, matter is then conceived 
by Plotinus as nothingness, or at least we can conclude that. This objection, 
however, does not take into account an essential feature of Plotinus’ thinking, i.e. 
its being centered on the idea of circularity: what flows out has to flow in again, 
hence that outbound energy necessarily is also inbound. Consequently, what 
gives direction to and informs Plotinus’ thought is not a scheme characterized by 
a line between two poles, one positive the other negative; but a circularity, where 
the main element, which Plotinus’ thought strives to grasp, is conceived of as the 
ultimately undetermined, because the ultimate potentiality coming before and 
enabling any actuality to be there.
How does the concept of θεωρία interact with the reality of that energy 
that flows from the One down to its last sparkling in matter? On this point, the 
thought of Plotinus becomes most obscure, but precisely because of this also most 
interesting: it is as if the very insight that Plotinus has in a way grasped exceeds 
the capacity of the words he tries to express it into. The problem Plotinus is 
facing is this: on the one hand, it is clear that if we push the dichotomy actuality-
potentiality to its ultimate consequences, we cannot but say that the ultimate 
foundation of reality is not the formal perfection of actuality, but the indefinite 
unboundedness of potentiality; on the other, we see that reality appears to us 
incidental attribute of matter; Matter itself, then is the unlimited. For in the intelligible world, 
too, matter is the unlimited, and it would be produced from the unlimitedness or the power 
or the everlastingness of the One; Unlimitedness is not in the One, but the One produces it»).
32 Cf. Enn. II 4.5, 15-18: «ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεία λαβοῦσα τὸ ὁρίζον αὐτὴν ζωὴν ὡρισμένην καὶ νοερὰν 
ἔχει, ἡ δὲ ὡρισμένον μέν τι γίγνεται, οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοοῦν, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον» («The 
divine matter when it receives that which defines ithas a defined and intelligent life, but the 
matter of this world becomes something defined, but not alive or thinking, a decorated corpse»).
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as an order of forms; how does form, any form, emerge out of that indefinite 
unboundedness? 
To answer this question Plotinus recurs to an image: the Intellect, before 
being Intellect, but still just as intelligible matter in its flowing out of the One 
turns on itself (ἐπιστροφή). This act whereby it sees itself through the light of the 
One constitutes this intelligible matter as Intellect. This act is the establishment 
and fixing of that perfect actuality that is the Intellect, and it runs always parallel 
and concomitantly with the unbound potentiality of the One: because of this, 
using words such as «before» or «after» is inappropriate, as this act has no 
beginning nor end, and those are expressions that the human mind has to make 
recourse to in its attempt to explain to itself the emergence of reality. Moreover, 
this act, perennial unfolding of the perfect actuality of the Intellect out of the 
unbound potentiality of the One, happens in and through silence (σιωπή), word 
(λόγος) emerging only in the interrogating reason of man. The world-soul, 
which constitutes the origin of nature (φύσις), while proceeding in its flowing 
out of the Intellect – much like this latter flows out of the One – turns on itself 
and gazes upon the Intellect, whose forms it grasps in their totality: out of this 
act of vision, i.e. θεωρία, the world of physical forms emerges, at once mirror 
of the perfection of the Intellect and final stage of the outflowing potentiality 
proceeding from the One. 
This process happens in silence, because it is not through an act of 
discursive reasoning that the world-soul grasps the forms (λόγοι) of the Intellect, 
but rather through an immediate act of vision. It is only in the inquisitive, 
discursive reasoning of man that the first sound breaks out, and together with 
it the stepping out of the act of production finally takes place. Plotinus points 
this out in the dialogue that he imagines between a man and nature itself, where 
to the questions of man regarding why (τίνος ἕνεκα) nature creates, it answers: 
ἐχρῆν μὴ ἐρωτᾶν, ἀλλὰ συνιέναι καὶ αὐτὸν σιωπῇ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σιωπῶ καὶ οὐκ εἴθισμαι 
λέγειν. Τί οὖν συνιέναι; ὅτι τὸ γενόμενόν ἐστι θέαμα ἐμόν, σιώπησις, καὶ φύσει γενόμενον 
θεώρημα, καί μοι γενομένῃ ἐκ θεωρίας τῆς ὡδὶ τῆν φύσιν ἔχειν φιλοθεάμονα ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ 
τὸ θεωροῦν μου θεώρημα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωροῦντες γράφουσιν· ἀλλ᾽ἐμοῦ μὴ 
γραφούσης, θεωρούσης δέ, ὑφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαὶ ὥσπερ ἐκπίπτουσαι33. 
What is central here is the divergence between discursive reason (διάνοια), 
which operates through rationalization (λογισμός) and understands any 
production as the fruit of a deliberation established on a previously thought out 
plan (the finalism of the «τίνος ἕνεκα») on the one hand, and the spontaneity of 
33 Enn. III 8.4, 3-10 («You ought not to ask, but to understand in silence, you, too, just as I 
am silent and not in the habit of talking. Understand what, then? That what comes into being 
is what I see in my silence, an object of contemplation which comes to be naturally, and that 
I, originating from this sort of contemplation have a contemplative nature. And my act of 
contemplation makes what it contemplates, as the geometers draw their figures while they 
contemplate. But I do not draw, but as I contemplate, the lines which bound bodies come to 
be as if they fell from my contemplation»).
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nature, whose production is the result of the overflowing abundance of the act of 
θεωρία. Man is not completely extraneous to this productive act, on the contrary 
in the arts it becomes manifest that when man produces and does so unimpeded, 
it is because his productive act is immediately in touch with the reality it gazes 
upon; whereas, it is precisely when this immediateness is interrupted or somehow 
impeded that discursive reason has to intervene, of which πρᾶξις, understood as 
governed by deliberation because of a weakening of the act of θεωρία, is the 
direct manifestation34. Hence, the productive activity of man can, in a way, be 
seen as the last sparkling of the originary productive energy emanating from the 
One, as it appears in the case of the productive activity of craftsmen35. 
The distinction between θεωρία and πρᾶξις, then, is not so much one 
between a dimension of fixed contemplation and one of action36, but rather 
one demarcating two levels of productivity: the former, the one of θεωρία, 
characterized by an operation which does not run on deliberation and because 
of this produces spontaneously and in the most powerful way; the latter, the 
one of human πρᾶξις, govern by deliberation and discursive reasoning, which 
however intervene only when man, in his producing, looses contact with the 
immediateness of his vision. Θεωρία is the immediate act of vision through 
which reality is generated, and in so far as this act is immediate deliberation and 
discursive thought are extraneous to it; πρᾶξις, instead, is that productive act, 
which appears once the energy of θεωρία is either impeded or has reached its 
final exhaustion. Thus, θεωρία, qua creative activity finds its point of arrival and 
static end in the production of physical realities on the one hand, and one last 
sparkle in the creative production of the human being on the other, although 
this latter is already characterized by deliberative and discursive reason.
The way in which the concept of θεωρία works within Plotinus’ thought 
is reminiscent to some points in Bergson: on the one hand, his distinction is 
somewhat similar to the one that Bergson establishes between «instinct» and 
«intelligence», while the fact that the productive activity of θεωρία ends up in 
the fixity of sensible objects in nature is reminiscent of the way in which he talks 
about physical nature on the other.
In L’évolution créatrice we read: «[…] instinct et intelligence sont deux 
développements divergents d’un même principe qui, dans un cas, reste intérieur 
à lui même, dans l’autre cas s’extériorise et s’absorbe dans l’utilisation de la 
34 Enn. ibid., 25-47.
35 On this point Plotinus goes against and beyond Plato’s condemnation of the arts as third 
level imitations of reality, suggesting even that the great artist corrects the shortcomings of real-
ity by gazing upon the eternal model: cf. Enn. V 8.1, 32-40, a passage all the more interesting 
in relation to what is said in III 8, if we keep in mind that V 8 is the treatise that comes right 
after III 8 and that before Porphyry’s editorial cutting formed together with it the so-called 
Großschrift, for which cf. R. Harder, Eine neue schrift Plotins, «Hermes», LXXI, 1936, 1, pp. 
1-10, followed by V. Cilento, Plotino. Paideia antignostica: ricostruzione d’un unico scritto da 
Enneadi III 8, V 8, V 5, II 9, Florence 1971; Cf. also P. Kalligas, Πλωτίνου. Ἐννεὰς Δευτέρα, 
Athens 1997, pp. 326-335.
36 As Bergson suggests, cf. L’évolution du problème, cit., 199-200; a point he reiterates in De la 
position des problèmes, in La pensée et le mouvant, Paris 2013, p. 92.  
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matière brute…»37. The couple instinct-intelligence is, thus, characterized by 
interiorization for the former and exteriorization for the latter, as we find also in 
Plotinus, in whose thought nature produces from within itself through the act 
of vision, whereas human πρᾶξις is an act of exteriorization, due to the inability 
of man to fully grasp within himself his object of vision. This dichotomy in 
Plotinus is evdient already in the opposing couple σιωπή of nature on the one 
hand, λογισμός of man on the other. By seeing in instinct the way in which nature 
operates, a way all comprised within an «inside» interior to the operation itself, 
Bergson fully embraces the concept of συμπάθεια, Stoic in origin but already 
embraced by Plotinus38. More importantly, as a consequence of this embracing, 
Bergson deepens his critic of the Aristotelian understanding of life, based as it 
is on the idea of a linear and ascending lather which from the inanimate goes to 
the animated, and within this latter sphere from the vegetative to the rational 
passing by the irrational. In rejecting this perspective Bergson’s thought is, I 
think, somewhat in line with Plotinus’ intuition that everything is θεωρία: for, 
this assertion breaks already the Aristotelian perspective and its fundamentally 
ascensional linearity. Man is not the only depositary of θεωρία, as Aristotle says, 
but he participates into it as any other living thing, in fact as the totality of 
nature; however, in him this takes a particular form, i.e. λογισμός, which by 
default puts man in an outside in relation to the working of nature, which is 
all immersed in its own inside. However, the difference between Bergson and 
Plotinus is to be found within this very alignment. For, Plotinus sees in the 
exteriorization of man’s activity due to his being bound to discursive reasoning 
a weakening of θεωρία, whereas in the ability man has through his intelligence 
to manipulate inanimate matter, through which he gets outside of the circle of 
instinct, Bergson sees the instantiation of freedom:
[l’instrument fabriqué intelligemment] pour chaque besoin qu’il satisfait, il crée 
un besoin nouveau, et ainsi, au lieu de fermer, comme l’instinct, le cercle d’action où 
l’animal va se mouvoir automatiquement, il ouvre à cette activité un champ indéfini où 
il la pousse de plus en plus loin et la fait de plus en plus libre39.
Moreover, a deeper difference between Plotinus and Bergson lays also in 
the very understanding of the working of nature, as this passage makes clear:
C’est sur la forme même de la vie, au contraire, qu’est moulé l’instinct. […] Si 
la conscience qui sommeille en lui se réveillait, s’il s’intériorisait en connaissance au 
lieux de s’extérioriser en action, s’il nous savions l’interroger et s’il pouvait répondre, 
il nous livrerait les secrets les plus intimes de la vie. […] nous ne saurions dire […] où 
l’organisation finit et où l’instinct commence40.
37 Cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, cit., pp. 168-169.
38 For the development on συμπάθεια, cf. H. Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, cit., pp. 169-177.
39 Ibid., p. 142, the italic is mine. 
40 Ibid., p. 166. We might notice, moreover, how this passage sounds similar to the way in 
which Plotinus speaks of nature in III 8.4: for, instinct just as nature is silent and it operates 
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For, Plotinus thinks that nature makes out of a model, what here Bergson 
calls «organization», even though this making does not imply planning and 
thus rationalizing (λογισμός), whereas Bergson sees in «instinct» not only the 
continuation of what is already organized, as if it followed a model, but instead 
every time the accomplishment of an unpredictable act of creation. This is why 
Bergson can speak of an imperceptible line, surely a line almost impossible to 
even think, which divides «organisation» from «instinct». However, underlining 
the concept of «organisation», Bergson stresses also the fact that instinct leads 
to a circle of automatic behavior, whereby the organisms caught in it tend to 
repeat the same acts all over again from one generation to the next. Opposite 
to this stands the freedom of intelligence, which represents precisely a breaking 
out from the circle of instinct. In turn, the line of contact between intelligence 
on the one hand, and instinct, hence the organization of the material world on 
the other, can be found in the fact that if for its part human intelligence works 
mathematically and geometrically, materiality and its organization is in its turn 
«lestée de géométrie»41. 
In reality, the two thinkers seem to coincide more than they differ. For, 
while both agree in rejecting any pretense on the part of rationalizing discourse, 
Plotinus cannot but see in nature the reproduction of a fixed model, although 
this very model is thought of as dynamically characterized by outflowing of the 
potentiality that is the One; Bergson sees the operation of nature as ultimately 
not bound by any fixed model, but rather as a free creative act. However, 
Plotinus is limited, as we noticed above, following a notation of Bergson, by 
the fundamental intellectualism of the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions: 
the strength of his reasoning leads him to postulate the principle, the One, as 
absolute potentiality, but then he immediately falls back on the idea that even 
this absolute potentiality, which per se should be thought of as totally unbound, 
responds to what it knows to be good (as we saw, when touching on the concept 
of «ἑκούσιον»). For Bergson, instead, freedom is the absolute potency of a will, 
which manifests itself in the élan vital: the forward going creative act of an 
instinct, which is bound as for its provenance, but unbound as for its proceeding. 
However, if the forward-looking freedom has to truly unfold, one has to be able 
to go back to that first élan, and accomplishing this is precisely the task of 
philosophy: 
Sa tâche propre [scil. de la philosophie] ne serait-elle pas, au contraire, de 
remonter la pente que la physique descend, de ramener la matière à ses origines, et 
de constituer progressivement une cosmologie qui serait, si l’on peut parler ainsi, une 
psychologie retournée?42
through a kind of sleeping state, out of which one would wish to be able to wake it up in order 
to interrogate it. 
41 Ibid., p. 221, where the famous image of the «poupées de liège» appears.
42 Ibid., p. 209; it is also worth noticing the expression «la pente de la physique» similar to the 
«la pente de la nature» used in L’évolution du problème, cit., p. 127 (for which cf. the note 199 
by A. François, p. 357): the nature Bergson speaks about there is the Aristotelian one, already 
understood and caught wihin the schemes of physics and mathematics.
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Does not this coincide with the task that Plotinus assigns to philosophy 
through his concept of θεωρία? For, while θεωρία describes the way in which 
everything comes to be, i.e. how production happens starting from the One, it 
also represents the direction the individual has to take, in order to go beyond the 
limits of discursive thought to attain unification with the principle of all reality, 
at whose level total freedom is to be found. This freedom is total because it 
coincides with an absolute will. On this point, the two philosophers are in perfect 
agreement, even though Plotinus falls back in the old Platonic and Aristotelian 
intellectualism, as we have seen above. Ultimately, both philosophers understand 
reality as the unfolding of freedom, but in turn freedom is declined as will43.  
43 This conclusion opens up a new question, which is impossible to address here, but which 
is worth to point out: What is thought through the word «will» in Bergson? This question 
articulates itself in this way: Is this «will» the same thing that gets explicitly formulated for the 
first time in Nietzsche? If so, are we to establish a link between Bergson and Nietzsche, to then 
find traces of what in that link is thought in thinkers of the past, such as Plotinus? Or through 
the One of Plotinus something else is being thought, which finds in the «will» just a more or 
less conventient expression? J. Beaufret, Dialogue avec Heidegger. Approche de Heidegger, Paris 
1974, pp. 218 and 220 notices that the durée is «création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté», 
quoting H. Bergson himself, to then add what Valéry says: «le nouveau est, par définition, la 
partie périssable des choses»; hence, the durée is a «‘substantialité’ ou une ‘solidité’ supérieure». 
Through the One is Plotinus aiming at this superior substantiality? Or is he thinking of 
something else, something that remains hidden within the plis of the language he inherited 
from Plato and Aristotle? Maybe, a beginning of an answer to these questions might come 
from reflecting on the ποιεῖν of the One, which does and remains other from what it does, yet 
being present to it.    
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